Brams and Taylor (1994) presented a version of the Divide-the-dollar game (DD), which they call DD1. DD1 suffers from the following drawback: when each player demands approximately the entire dollar, then if the least greedy player is unique, then this player obtains approximately the entire dollar even if he is only slightly less greedy than the other players. I introduce a parametrized family of 2-person DD games whose "endpoints" (the games that correspond to the extreme points of the parameter space) are (1) a variant of DD1, and (2) a game that completely overcomes the greediness-related problem. I also study an n-person generalization of this family. Finally, I show that the modeling choice between discrete and continuous bids may have far-reaching implications in DD games.
demands is at least one, and the equilibrium-multiplicity problem is significantly mitigated. 2 which the greediness-related problem can occur. The higher is λ, the smaller is the scope of the problem. When λ = 1, the problem is completely solved. On the other hand, small values of λ allow for severe punishment of the most greedy player.
3
Another issue I address is the fact that the analysis in BT is carried out for the case of discrete bids. Namely, there is a minimal money-unit-a "cent"-and all demands must be multiples of it. There are two reasons to relax this assumption.
First, the "cent" takes the form δ =
nK
, where n is the number of players and K is some positive integer. Therefore, the model contains an unbreakable link between the number of players and the grid of currency-two conceptually unrelated quantities.
Second, one would like to set up the environment in a way that gives some flexibility in altering the rules of the game; namely, an environment in which a variety of DD games can be defined. The discreteness assumption hurts this flexibility. To illustrate the point with a concrete example, consider the following DD game, DD * , due to Anbarci (2001) . In its 2-person version, when the demands are infeasible, namely when x 1 + x 2 > 1, each player i receives the payoff f i x i , where
. The 2 DD1 has multiple Nash equilibria, but they are all payoff-equivalent. In any equilibrium each player obtains the egalitarian utility level. 3 Abusing terminology a little, I call any divide-the-dollar game a DD game. A general DD game is a game which is identical to the canonical DD that was described in the first paragraph of this Introduction, with the sole exception that when the sum of demands exceeds one, the dollar need not be wasted-it (or a fraction of it) can be distributed in some way among the players. , which is not a multiple of cents.
In reality money is discrete, hence one may argue that this discreteness should be reflected in the model. My point is that even though discreteness is realistic, it expresses a constraint which should not be at the center stage of the analysis. The money-continuity assumption, which is typical to bidding games, is therefore in place.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 I present a list of conditions for DD games, due to BT, called reasonableness conditions. In Section 3 I revisit DD1, but, as opposed to BT, under the assumption that money is continuous (an assumption I will maintain throughout the paper). I denote the DD1 game under continuous demands by cDD1. Both DD1 and cDD1 are reasonable. The choice between continuity and discreteness of money has far-reaching implications.
In DD1 there are multiple (payoff equivalent) Nash equilibria and an equilibrium can be arrived by iteratively removing weakly dominated strategies; additionally, in the 2-person DD1, as in any 2-person reasonable DD game with discrete demands, the egalitarian demand level is weakly dominated. 4 By contrast, in cDD1 the vector of egalitarian demands is the unique Nash equilibrium, and the egalitarian demand level
is not a weakly dominated strategy. In Section 4 I present the family of 2-person DD 1] to n bidders is in Section 5.
In Section 6 I conclude.
The reasonableness conditions
BT specify five conditions for DD games, which are satisfied, in particular, by DD1.
They call any DD game that respects these conditions reasonable. The conditions are:
(1) Equal treatment of equal demands.
(2) No player's payoff is more than his demand. 3 cDD1: the DD1-game with continuous demands
Suppose that each player can submit any demand in [0, 1]. In particular, there is no minimal money-unit. I now define a DD1-type game for this environment. To this end, the following notation and definitions will be helpful.
Every profile of demands, x = (x 1 , · · · , x n ) ∈ [0, 1] n , can be partitioned into equivalence classes according to the values of its coordinates. An equivalence class consists of the coordinates that assume the same value; namely, it is a set of the form {i, j : x i = x j }. Suppose that these classes are labeled "from the bottom up," so higher demands belong to higher-indexed classes. Let k i and I i be the following functions of demand: k i (x) denotes the number of class to which player/coordinate i belongs (so x i < x j implies k i (x) < k j (x)) and I i (x) denotes the number of players/coordinates that are in the same equivalence class as player/coordinate i. The continuous version of DD1-hereafter cDD1-is the DD game the utility functions of which are the following:
) is its unique Nash equilibrium. The egalitarian demand,
, is not a weakly dominated strategy in this game.
Proof. Note that conditions (1) and (3)- (5) are straightforward. As for condition (2) , note that the only way for player i to obtain a payoff above x i is if his payoff obeys the third line from the definition of the utility function. In this case, to have the payoff exceed the demand one needs
Therefore, cDD1 is reasonable.
As for equilibrium uniqueness, first note that (
any demand deviation downward decreases one's payoff and any deviation up leaves it unchanged. Now let x be an arbitrary equilibrium. Let l be the common demand in its first equivalence class (namely, l is the minimum demand in x).
Case 1: x i = l for all i. It has to be that ln ≥ 1; namely, the demands exhaust the dollar. Otherwise, if ln < 1, then each player could increase his payoff by deviating to l + ∆, where
Next, I argue that l > 1 n is impossible. The reason is that in this case each player could increase his payoff by deviating to some l ∈ (
Case 2: There is an i with x i > l. Let m be the common bid of the second equivalence class. Let k be the number of players in the first equivalence class. I argue that kl ≥ 1; namely, the sum of minimal demands exhausts the dollar. Otherwise, each of the lowest bidders could strictly benefit by deviating to l+∆, for ∆ ∈ (0, m−l).
Note that by doing that a deviator becomes a singleton second equivalence class and his payoff, consequently is one of the following two: (a) l + ∆ > l-in case that his demand can be met after all the k − 1 minimal bidders have been paid; or (b) , and the dollar is shared equally between the minimal bidders. But this, in turn, means that each i with x i > l is not playing a best-response. Therefore, (
) is the unique equilibrium.
Finally, we need to prove that
is not weakly dominated; wlog, consider i = 1. Assume by contradiction that the egalitarian demand is dominated for player 1. Let z be some other demand that weakly dominates the egalitarian demand. Since it is possible for all other players to demand zero, it has to be that z >
By the rules of the game, the LHS equals 1 − (n − 1)y and the RHS equals Proposition 1 shows that there is a significant difference between the current model and the discrete-money model. In the latter, any reasonable 2-person DD game is such that the egalitarian demand level is a weakly dominated strategy. In particular, this applies to DD1. By contrast, the egalitarian demand level is not weakly dominated in cDD1. Moreover, DD1 has multiple Nash equilibria, whereas cDD1 has a unique equilibrium. Say that a 2-person DD game with utility functions {u 1 , u 2 } has an inequality parameter γ if:
A small value of γ prevents the aforementioned problem, as a small γ means that when the two players are extremely greedy (each demands, approximately, the entire dollar) then there may be discrimination against the one who is more greedy, but there are limits to discrimination; specifically, the limits of discrimination are given by γ.
Note that γ, by definition, is between zero and one. Therefore, cDD1's performance in this regard is the worst possible, since its inequality parameter is γ = 1.
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While a low value of γ is obviously desirable, a high value of γ also has an upside, at least under condition (4) from the BT list. Note that when the demands are jointly infeasible and one player is more greedy than the other, we may wish to punish this player, which means giving him a low payoff; but by condition (4) this means giving a relatively high payoff to the other player, which, in turn, results in a high value for the inequality parameter. Therefore, there is a tradeoff between two competing principles:
(i) similar treatment of greedy players, versus (ii) awarding the least greedy player. Below is a parametrized family of 2-person DD games, in which the parameter that corresponds to each family member captures this tradeoff.
Given λ ∈ [0, 1], let DD λ denote the 2-person DD game in which the utility of player 1 is as follows and that of player 2 is defined analogously:
(ii) Also, note that DD 0 =cDD1, because with λ = 0 (ii) and (iii) can never be realized.
Proposition 2. For each λ ∈ [0, 1), the game DD λ has a unique Nash equilibrium:
).
Proof. The case λ = 0 was covered in Theorem 1. Fix then a λ ∈ (0, 1) and consider the corresponding game. First, let us verify that (
) is indeed an equilibrium.
Wlog, consider player 1. Obviously, decreasing his demand is suboptimal. If he increases it then the resulting case is either (ii) or (v). In the former case his payoff is
. In the latter case his payoff is without a change- . Therefore, (
is a Nash equilibrium. Now let (x, y) be an equilibrium. Clearly, x + y ≥ 1. I argue that x + y = 1. To , which is smaller than 1 2 -which is what player 1 can achieve by playing y.
If (v) is the case then y <
, which is impossible in equilibrium, because player 2 could increase his demand by a sufficiently small > 0 and increase his payoff (note that as long as we are in case (v) player 2's payoff equals his demand, since it is given by the payoff rule of cDD1). Therefore, if x + y > 1 then x = y. This, again, cannot occur in equilibrium because by a small decrease of his demand player 1 can increase his payoff. To see this, let us consider two cases separately.
then by an infinitesimal decrease of his demand player 1 can obtain a payoff which is approximately
, and
Case 2: y ≤
. Here, by deviating to y − player 1 triggers the DD1 payment rule, and therefore obtains y − > . Then player 1 has a profitable deviation: from x to 1 − x. Therefore, (
As λ increases the most greedy player is being penalized less severely. The inequality parameter of DD λ is γ = 1 − λ. Hence, there is a tradeoff between minimizing the inequality parameter and decreasing the incentive to be greedy. This tradeoff results in the fact that when the inequality parameter is minimized, extreme greediness can occur in equilibrium. , 1}.
) is an equilibrium follows from precisely the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 1.
Consider (1, 1) . By the rules of the game (the demands are in the unit interval), the only possible deviation is downwards. Consider, wlog, such a deviation by player
The possible cases that player 1 can trigger by his deviation are (i), (iii), and (v).
Obviously triggering (i)-namely, deviation to 0-is suboptimal. In case (iii) player 1's payoff does not change-it remains 1 2 . Finally, in order to trigger (v) it needs to be that the demand to which player 1 deviates, call it x, satisfies x < 1 2
; since in this case player 1's payoff receives his demanded amount (by the rules of cDD1), the deviation is strictly suboptimal. Therefore, (1, 1) is an equilibrium.
Now consider (1, , and in case (iv) player 1's payoff remains 1 2 . Finally, (v) is also sub-optimal: since player 2
, player 1 cannot get more than . Therefore (1, ) is an equilibrium. Similarly,
, 1) is an equilibrium. Now let (x, y) be an arbitrary equilibrium. Consider first x = y; wlog, x > y.
Clearly, (i) is impossible. Therefore, x + y > 1. Also, (v) is impossible, since in this case player 2 can increase his payoff by increasing his demand. Cases (iii) and (iv) are impossible and we are therefore led to (ii), and therefore to x = 1. If y ∈ { Let Π be the set of permutations on {1, · · · , n}. Fix θ ∈ [0,
n be the set of demand vectors x that satisfy the following four conditions:
•
for all k = 1, · · · , n − 1.
.
Define DD θ to be the n-person DD game with the utility functions {u 
otherwise To make this definition more transparent, let us look at the case where π is the identity. Consider then x ∈ X π θ where π is the identity. Each i < n obtains
and player n obtains the remainder of the dollar,
. Note that for n = 2 DD θ =DD λ , where λ = θ. Analogously to λ = 0 from the 2-person case, θ = 0 corresponds to cDD1.
It is easy to verify that DD θ is reasonable and that (
) is an equilibrium of this game. The following result describes an additional condition under which it is the game's unique equilibrium. . I argue that every such i has a profitable deviation. Note that when he deviates and ties with the minimum bidder (i.e., the deviation is x i → x n ) he secures the payoff ; the deviation is profitable, since
Since every i should find the abovementioned deviation non-profitable, it follows that
(1 − θ n ). Since x ∈ X π θ and x 1 = 1 it follows that x n ≥ θ n .
8 Therefore (n − 1)θ n ≤ 1 2
(1 − θ n ). Rearranging this gives θ n ≤ . Since x is an equilibrium, x i ≥ 1. Moreover, this inequality is strict. If not then x n < 1 n , and we obtain: there is an i < n such that x i < θx 1 1+x 1
. Since x i > x n we obtain the contradiction
. Claim 1 is proved.
It follows from Claim 1 that if player n increases his demand by a sufficiently small amount then the resulting demand vector would still be outside of ∪ θ X θ and hence the payment rule would still be as in cDD1. Therefore, this deviation is profitable.
Thus, there is a "tie" at the minimum demand. Moreover, only two players are tied at the minimum demand level; otherwise, the demand vector would not be one deviation away from ∪ θ X θ . Therefore, x 1 ≥ · · · ≥ x n−2 > x n−1 = x n . Let t ≡ x n = x n−1 . . The reason is that after such a deviation the maximal bid remains x 1 and the minimum bid strictly decreases.
The new (post deviation) minimum has to be at least as large as , the dollar is divided evenly between players {n, n − 1}. By deviating to t − , for a sufficiently small > 0, player i ∈ {n, n − 1} secures a payoff of at least min{t − , By Proposition 1, x is not an equilibrium of cDD1. Therefore, under the cDD1 rule there is a player, say h, who has a profitable deviation. Let x be the demand vector that results from the deviation. Therefore, u cDD1 h
